Abstract Wireless sensor networks are often queried for aggregates such as predicate count, sum, and average. In untrusted environments, sensors may potentially be compromised. Existing approaches for securely answering aggregation queries in untrusted sensor networks can detect whether the aggregation result is corrupted by an attacker. However, the attacker (controlling the compromised sensors) can keep corrupting the result, rendering the system unavailable. This paper aims to enable aggregation queries to tolerate instead of just detecting the adversary. To this end, we propose a novel tree sampling algorithm that directly uses sampling to answer aggregation queries. It leverages a set sampling protocol to overcome a well-known obstacle in sampling-traditional sampling technique is only effective when the predicate count or sum is large. Set sampling can efficiently sample a set of sensors together, and determine whether any sensor in the set satisfies the predicate (but not how many). With set sampling as a building block, tree sampling can provably generate a correct answer despite adversarial interference, while without the drawbacks of traditional sampling techniques.
Introduction

Background
Wireless sensor networks are often queried for aggregates such as predicate count (e.g., number of sensors sensing fire), sum, and average. To answer these aggregation queries, traditional (non-secure) approaches typically use innetwork aggregation along an aggregation tree [22] . In the aggregation tree, the root is the base station and all other tree nodes are sensors. Each sensor combines the results from its children, incorporates its own value, and then forwards a single value to its parent. In untrusted environments, sensors may potentially be compromised. These compromised sensors may launch two kinds of attacks: (i) report arbitrary readings themselves, and (ii) manipulate the partial aggregation results that pass through them. It is generally impossible to prevent the first attack without domain specific knowledge. Fortunately, it is also well-know that for robust aggregates [30] such as predicate count and sum, the first attack's influence is limited, as long as the fraction of malicious sensors is not overwhelming. The second attack can be much more serious since even a single malicious sensor can completely corrupt the final result. Thus the need to make aggregation queries secure against the second attack has been widely acknowledged [5, 6, 10, 15, 19, 20, 23, 32, 33 ].
Previous results and motivation
Most pioneering efforts [5, 10, 19, 20, 23] on secure aggregation queries make strong restrictive assumptions (e.g., assuming a single malicious sensor [19, 20] or assuming single-level aggregation [5, 10, 23] ). Hierarchical secure aggregation [6, 15] is one of the first protocols that make general aggregation queries secure with provable guarantees.
Unfortunately, the protocol can only detect but not tolerate malicious sensors. Namely, they enable the user to verify whether the result is corrupted. But even a single malicious sensor can keep preventing the verification from succeeding, in which case the user can never get a correct result. Thus despite that compromising a single sensor is a local attack on one sensor, the effect of such attack is "amplified" by the protocol into a global DoS attack that renders the entire system unavailable. In such cases, [6] suggests having all sensors send individual readings back to the base station, which can be prohibitively expensive in large-scale systems. Another recent approach [29] has similar limitations-the attacker can launch multi-hop flooding attacks [9, 27, 31 ] from a few malicious sensors to stall the aggregation process.
We argue that for many applications, it is critical for the system to tolerate instead of just detecting the adversary. In other words, the aggregation queries must be both secure and highly-available, and the algorithm must have both "safety" and "liveness" guarantees. When under attack, detecting the adversary only makes the system harmless and not cause any damage. It is tolerating the adversary that makes the system useful. Without availability guarantees, the adversary (with human intelligence and judgment) would make the system unavailable precisely when the service is needed the most. For example, in battlefield monitoring, the enemy could cause the system to be unavailable exactly when the battle starts.
Our approach and results
This paper aims to design protocols with provable guarantees that can always correctly answer aggregation queries despite adversarial interference. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort toward such a goal in the general setting. Tolerating the adversary is typically much harder than simply detecting it. For example, byzantine consensus is much harder than just detecting inconsistency in the consensus protocol execution. A natural and seemingly obvious direction is to extend previous detection-only protocols to automatically pinpoint and revoke malicious sensors whenever the final result is corrupted. Unfortunately, because of the nature of these protocols and also because the malicious sensors may interfere with pinpointing as well, pinpointing malicious sensors is far from trivial and is a active research topic by itself. Secondly, malicious sensors may interfere sequentially one by one. This means that the service disruption time and the revocation overhead are at least linear with the number of malicious sensors.
As a result, we choose to substantially depart from most existing approaches [5, 6, 10, 15, 19, 20, 23, 33] , which typically try to fix the security holes in in-network aggregation. We propose a novel tree sampling protocol that directly uses randomized sampling to answer aggregation queries.
Despite adversarial interference, tree sampling can always produce a standard (ε, δ)-approximation of the correct result (i.e., the approximation is within (1±ε) multiplicative factor of the correct result with probability at least 1 − δ).
Sampling has the nice security property that each sample involves the reading of a single sensor, and thus its integrity can be easily verified. This conveniently avoids the key challenge in in-network aggregation, where intermediate sensors need to aggregate multiple values into a single one and malicious sensors may not aggregate faithfully. However, sampling has its own well-known challenge-it is only efficient when the predicate count or sum is large. More precisely, the well-known lower bound [8] shows that with n sensors and the predicate count being b, To address this challenge, we propose a simple but powerful set sampling technique to efficiently sample a set of sensors together. Sampling a set will tell whether any sensor in the set satisfies the predicate (but not how many sensors), with only O(1) bits communication overhead on any sensor. Leveraging set sampling, our tree sampling protocol uses a binary tree to construct randomized sets and then samples those sets adaptively. This binary tree is a local data structure maintained by the base station, and has no relation to network topology. To compute the predicate count using tree sampling, each sensor only needs to send/receive O 1 ε 2 log 1 δ log n bits, where δ = δ/(log max(4ε 2 n, 2)). Under practical parameters, log 1 δ is almost never larger than 3 log 1 δ . 1 In such cases, we have O 1 ε 2 log 1 δ log n as the total number of bits. We further show that with some additional and more complex algorithmic tricks, tree sampling can even do better so that each sensor sends/receives only O Obviously, tree sampling overcomes the previous lower bound of n b 1 ε 2 log 1 δ , and reduces the linear communication overhead to logarithmic overhead (with respect to n). This does not, however, contradict with the lower bound since our set sampling technique samples sets of sensors together, instead of sampling sensors individually (as assumed by the lower bound). Simulation shows that under the same parameters, naive sampling can achieve a similar estimation error as tree sampling only when roughly b > 0.2n. Next, leveraging the nice security property of sampling, we show that some 1 For example, log 1 δ ≤ 3 log 1 δ holds for any ε ≤ 0.5, δ ≤ 0.1, and n ≤ 10 10 . minor (but subtle) modifications to tree sampling are sufficient to make it robust against malicious behavior (without affecting the protocol's overhead).
In summary, our novel tree sampling protocol provides qualitatively improved functionality (i.e., guaranteed availability) compared to existing secure aggregation protocols. The protocol leverages the nice/clean security property of sampling to achieve our end goal. It is worth noting that we do not aim for better performance than previous detectiononly protocols, though we will see later that some of them have comparable performance overheads as ours.
Related work
Secure aggregation
Hierarchical secure aggregation [6, 15] assumes that the exact set of live/reachable sensors is known. As a result, any single dead sensor, destroyed sensor, radio-jammed sensor, or compromised sensor can keep causing the final result to fail verification. It is not obvious how to relax this assumption, especially because their protocol needs the base station to verify the XOR of the MACs (i.e., Message Authentication Codes) generated by all sensors. Pinpointing and revoking the problematic sensors in untrusted sensor networks can be far from trivial, and is an active research topic by itself. In particular, when the verification fails in [6, 15] , the base station does not actually know which sensors' MACs are missing. Similarly, the recent SECOA secure aggregation protocol [26] also involves verification of combined values. It can thus become unavailable whenever a single malicious aggregator keeps corrupting the aggregation result.
Roy et al. [29] use verifiable Flajolet-Martin synopses [14] to make the aggregation secure. The idea is for sensors to generate MACs to "vouch" for the "1" bits in the Flajolet-Martin synopsis. However, because the MACs can only be verified by the base station and not by intermediate sensors forwarding the message, such a design makes multi-hop flooding attacks [9, 27, 31] possible. Namely, the adversary can inject many messages with fake MACs, which will all be forwarded to the base station and stall the propagation of legitimate messages. Compared to both approaches [6, 15, 29] , our protocol can always answer the aggregation query despite all such attacks.
Yang et al. [33] propose a heuristic approach where the sensors are partitioned into groups and each group produces a single aggregation result. Groups with "outlier" results will be further probed. The error bound in their approach depends on deployment-specific factors such as sensor reading distribution and positions of the malicious sensors. In comparison, we aim to achieve provable approximation error. For secure aggregation in the Internet, Garofalakis et al. [17] use a similar approach as [29] except that the vouches are public key digital signatures. Generating digital signatures can be (prohibitively) expensive for resource-constrained sensors.
Sampling
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to propose the concept of tree sampling and set sampling for securely estimating aggregates such as predicate count and sum. In some sense, the different levels on our sampling tree mimic bitmaps of different resolutions in Estan et al. [13] for counting network flows. Unlike their work, we focus on how to estimate the final result without knowing the contents of all the "bitmaps". Sampling of individual sensors is used in [5, 33] for detecting corrupted aggregation results, instead of computing the result. Sampling of individual sensors is also used in trusted environments to catch big events or "elephants" [16] (similar to b being large).
Certain algorithms for duplicate-insensitive counting, such as Flajolet-Martin synopses [14] , implicitly "test" sets of multiple data items. To observe the underlying implicit connection, notice that each bit in a Flajolet-Martin synopsis actually corresponds to a set of data items that hash to the corresponding bit position. However, given its target applications, Flajolet-Martin's algorithm still examines the data items one by one. In comparison, by associating each set with a symmetric key and with proper key pre-distribution in our context, our set sampling protocol can sample the whole set with constant overhead per sensor. Furthermore, even if one applied such key pre-distribution technique to FlajoletMartin's synopses, it would still fall short of achieving our goal-doing so would require a sensor to hold one symmetric key for each Flajolet-Martin synopsis. Since the number of Flajolet-Martin synopses needed depends on the target estimation quality, this number may vary from query to query and can also be large. In comparison in our tree sampling algorithm, the number of symmetric keys held by each sensor does not depend on the target estimation quality. Higher estimation quality can always be achieved by sampling more sets.
The well-known notion of Ranked Set Sampling (RSS) [7] in statistics, though with a similar name, is fundamentally different from our set sampling. RSS is designed for cases where each item may be either examined with low fidelity (e.g., visual inspection) or with high fidelity (e.g., precise measurement). With RSS, a set of sampled items is first examined with low fidelity and one of them is further examined with high fidelity.
Decision tree complexity
From a theoretical perspective, using set sampling to estimate aggregates belongs to the classic topic of decision tree complexity of various functions [4] . With set sampling, each node on the decision tree corresponds to a query specifying some subset of the bits, and invoking the query will determine whether any bits in the subset is "1". This particular kind of decision tree has been previously studied [1, 3] (called OR-decision tree in [3] and 1 + -decision tree in [1] ), mainly for the t-threshold function. The t-threshold function takes n (initially unrevealed) bits as input and aims to determine whether the sum of the n bits is at least t. In comparison, our predicated count aggregate aims to compute the (approximate) sum of the n bits. Obviously, the t-threshold function and the predicate count function are reducible from each other (while incurring at most an additional O(log n) factor in complexity).
Ben-Asher and Newman [3] have shown that the deterministic complexity for t-threshold function has a tight lower bound of (t log(n/t)). If one were to use their algorithm to directly compute predicate count (e.g., via a binary search), then t would need to be near b. Thus for b = (n c ) where c is a constant bounded away from 0 and 1, the overhead incurred will be polynomial with respect to n. Under the same b, naive sampling with complexity of n b 1 ε 2 log 1 δ will also incur polynomial overhead. In comparison, our tree sampling algorithm will only incur logarithmic overhead in such cases. Such improvement is possible because we consider randomized algorithms with non-zero error. Ben-Asher and Newman [3] also mention randomized algorithms in their work, but the results are restricted to t = 2 (and thus cannot be extended to predicate count). Specifically, they prove that for t = 2, the complexity of zero-error randomized algorithms is lower bounded by (log n), while the complexity of randomized algorithms with δ error is upper bounded by O(log 1 δ ). Aspnes et al. [1] further generalize the above OR-decision tree to k + -decision tree where each query may tell the algorithm whether the number of "1" bits in the specified set is 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, or at least k. Obviously, set sampling and OR-decision tree correspond to 1 + -decision tree in such terminology. They prove that for k ≥ 2, the zero-error randomized k + -decision tree complexity of the t-threshold function is O(t/k). In our secure aggregation context, it is not clear how one can efficiently (i.e., with o(k) factor of extra overhead) implement the queries needed in the k + -decision tree for large k. Even if we could, notice that the O(t/k) complexity will still translate to polynomial overhead for predicate count (unless k approaches t). This suggests that allowing approximation error might be necessary to bring down the overhead to logarithmic (as in our tree sampling algorithm).
Model and problem statement
We consider a multi-hop sensor network with n deployed sensors and a trusted base station. The number of live sensors is unknown to our protocol. We assume a synchronous timing model and assume that the base station knows an upper bound on the (multi-hop) round-trip time of the network.
Attack model
The adversary may compromise an arbitrary number of sensors, and potentially launch attacks from more powerful devices such as laptops. The adversary has a network-wide presence and may eavesdrop or inject messages at any point in the network. To make the system unavailable, the adversary may further launch a wide range of DoS-related attacks: (i) physically destroying the sensors, (ii) radio-jamming the sensors, and (iii) launching DoS-related attacks from compromised sensors. One example of the last kind of attack is multi-hop flooding [9, 27, 31] 2 where the compromised sensors generate many fake responses. These responses are then all forwarded by honest sensors to the base station, which can stall the propagation of legitimate replies. Because the forwarding capacity of sensors is usually quite limited, it is rather easy for the fake messages to saturate such forwarding capacity. Multi-hop flooding is a serious attack in the sense that the honest sensors (by forwarding the fake messages) are unknowingly helping to "amplify" the scope of the attack.
We aim to provide aggregation results of the readings from those sensors that are not destroyed or radio-jammed. Destroyed sensors, radio-jammed sensors, and compromised sensors may potentially partition the sensor network. In such cases, our protocol will compute the aggregation results of the readings from those sensors that have paths to and from the base station. We do not assume symmetric links. If needed, by computing a secure count in parallel, the base station can estimate the number of reachable sensors which have contributed to the final result.
In the remainder of the paper, to unify terminology and simplify discussion, we pessimistically consider all physically destroyed, radio-jammed, compromised, and partitioned sensors (that do not have paths to/from the base station) as malicious sensors. Other sensors are honest. A malicious sensor is byzantine and controlled by the adversary.
Approximation error and performance metrics
Our goal is to compute (ε, δ)-approximation answers for aggregation queries such as predicate count, sum, and average. An (ε, δ)-approximation is guaranteed to be within (1 ± ε) multiplicative factor of the correct answer with probability at least 1 − δ. 3 As in [5, 6, 15, 29] , here a correct result allows malicious sensors to report arbitrary readings for themselves, but they are not allowed to add additional fabricated readings or change the reported readings of honest sensors. For convenience later, we assume that ε ≤ 0.5 and δ ≤ 0.5. We further define δ = δ/ log max(4ε 2 n, 2). All log s in this paper are base-2.
We mainly use bit complexity (also called node congestion in [6] ) as the performance measure, which is the number of bits sent and received by individual sensors (including those bits forwarded for other sensors during multihop forwarding). When analyzing the bit complexity of the algorithms, we assume there is no packet collision over the wireless channels. This is a standard assumption made by all prior work [6, 15, 29] on secure aggregation queries in sensor networks, and we inherit such assumption to enable proper comparison. At the protocol level, our tree sampling algorithm mainly uses flooding. How to optimize the performance of such flooding/broadcast operation in a collisionprone environment is a well-studied and separate topic (e.g., see [2] ). Finally, in addition to bit complexity, we will also study the time complexity (measured in terms of synchronous rounds) of our algorithm.
Cryptographic primitives
Our protocol will only use symmetric key cryptography. Public key cryptography has become feasible [18] in some specific contexts [11] with specific sensor hardware. But it remains much more expensive than symmetric key operations. Using only symmetric key cryptography thus makes our protocols more general and more efficient.
We will assume that standard cryptographic primitives, such as one-way hash functions and MACs (Message Authentication Codes), cannot be broken. We will use 8-byte MACs and one-way hashes, which is rather typical in security protocols [27, 28] for sensor networks. In particular in our tree sampling algorithm, the MACs and one-way hashes are always generated from fresh nonces. Once generated, they can only be used within a rather short time window (i.e., within the multi-hop round-trip time of the sensor network). This short time window further increases the difficulty of breaking the MACs or one-way hashes.
Overview of our approach
The main challenge in secure in-network aggregation is to prevent malicious sensors from behaving dishonestly when aggregating multiple values into one. Somewhat ironically, leveraging sensors to aggregate data in-network is exactly the key idea behind in-network aggregation. In comparison, sampling has the nice security property that each sample only involves a single sensor's reading and thus it is easy to make it secure (e.g., by including a MAC on the sample). The challenge is how to avoid requiring an excessive number of samples when the predicate count or sum is small.
Our novel design of set sampling and tree sampling overcomes this challenge. To ensure that the sample request (reply) always reaches the sampled sensor (base station) despite adversarial interference, the request (reply) often needs to be flooded to all sensors already. 4 Set sampling allows any sensor in some given set to respond to the request, since they all see the request already. But to avoid (1) bit complexity near the base station, only a single response will be forwarded back to the base station. Sampling each set thus conceptually involves flooding the network twice, requiring each sensor to send/receive exactly two 8-byte payloads (see later for explanation on the payload size).
It is worth emphasizing that flooding is not inherently more expensive than local communication among neighboring sensors. For example, most previous secure aggregation protocols [6, 15, 17, 29] do not involve flooding, but require each sensor to communicate with its neighbors. However, flooding the network x times incurs exactly the same overhead as requiring each sensor to send/receive x messages to/from its neighbors. Instead of quantifying the overhead as numbers of flooding or numbers of local communication, we directly use bit complexity as a unified metric.
Tree sampling samples O 1 ε 2 log 1 δ log n sets where multiple samples can potentially be combined in one message. Our simulation later will show that even under n = 10,000, tree sampling can achieve an average ε of 0.08 while incurring only 250-300 samples. These samples are taken in around 5-15 sequential stages. For smaller n, the number of samples needed will be smaller as well.
Tree sampling has a rather similar bit complexity as Roy et al.'s detection-only aggregation protocol [29] and also Garofalakis et al.'s protocol [17] . All these protocols have a 1 ε 2 factor. This is quite fundamental in approximate counting and sampling: Even the well-know synopsis diffusion protocol [25] , which is for aggregation in trusted environments, has such 1 ε 2 factor. Because of this 1 ε 2 factor, tree sampling works best if ε is not too small. As some concrete examples, Garofalakis et al. [17] mainly focus on ε between 0.1 and 0.25, while synopsis diffusion [25] considers ε around 0.15. Quite interestingly, the motivation behind synopsis diffusion is exactly to reduce the large ε error (well above 0.15) that results from message losses in traditional tree-based aggregation such as TAG [22] . 5 In other words, driving ε much lower than 0.1 can be non-trivial even in trusted environments.
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Set sampling
This section first describes a simple keyed predicate test protocol to make sampling robust against multi-hop flooding attacks, and then discuss set sampling. We discuss tree sampling afterward.
Keyed predicate test
Sampling is in general quite robust against adversarial interference. The sampled sensor can generate a MAC (i.e., Message Authentication Code) on the reading and then flood the reply back to the base station. But the malicious sensors can still launch multi-hop flooding attacks [9, 27, 31] and inject many fake replies to stall the propagation of the legitimate reply. Without public key cryptography, a forwarding sensor cannot authenticate the source of a reply and thus cannot tell whether the reply originates from the sampled sensor. As a result, the sensor will forward all the fake replies, potentially exhausting its forwarding capacity. This is similar to a DoS attack on router forwarding capacity in the Internet, except that multi-hop flooding attacks are much easier to launch due to sensors' limited forwarding capacity. Rate limiting will not help because a malicious sensor can claim that it is just forwarding replies originated from other sensors. Public key cryptography will not completely remove the problem either, since the sensors will need to both generate and verify signatures. This restricts the applicability of cryptographic techniques (e.g., Rabin signatures) with asymmetric cost.
Fortunately, there are existing solutions to tolerate multihop flooding attacks in the context of authenticated broadcast (from the base station). For example, Ning et al. [27] mitigate such attacks using message puzzles created by the base station (which has ample computational resources). Our keyed predicate test protocol will leverage such multihop-floodingresilient "base station → sensor" communication to enable multihop-flooding-resilient "sensor → base station" communication (for the propagation of sample replies). From now on, by "authenticated broadcast" or "broadcast", we mean authenticated broadcast approaches (e.g., [27] ) that are resilient to multi-hop flooding.
The keyed predicate test protocol tests whether any sensor holding a particular symmetric key K satisfies a certain predicate. We do not make any assumption on the number of sensors holding K -this will be useful later. For now we assume that a sensor holding K also knows some "name" for uniquely referring to K , so that the base station can refer to the key by its name without revealing the key itself. Later Sect. 9 will show that the "name" is not actually needed.
In the protocol, the base station first (authenticated) broadcasts to all sensors:
Here N is a nonce and H() is some well-known oneway hash function. MAC K (N ) is the MAC generated on N using key K . An honest sensor holding K and satisfying the predicate will generate and locally broadcast the reply, MAC K (N ) , to its neighbors. Any malicious sensor holding key K may do so as well. Other sensors simply record/store the hash H(MAC K (N )). This hash serves as a fingerprint of MAC K (N ). It allows the sensors to verify the valid reply of MAC K (N ) , without enabling them to generate the reply if they do not know K . A (malicious) sensor not knowing K can replay the valid reply after seeing it at least once, but we will show that this does not matter. If an honest sensor receives a message whose hash matches the hash stored, it forwards the message via a local broadcast and then discards the stored hash.
Such design effectively prevents multi-hop flooding attacks: The only message that will propagate in the network is MAC K (N ) , and furthermore every sensor will forward it at most once. Malicious sensors can inject fake responses, but those will never be forwarded. Fundamentally, we can achieve this because the base station knows the potential reply (i.e., MAC K (N )), and can pre-compute and broadcast its hash. This also means that keyed predicate test only allows the base station to pose "yes/no" questions.
If within some timeout, the base station receives MAC K (N ), we say that the test succeeds. The following theorem summarizes the security property of the protocol. Intuitively, only a sensor holding K can potentially create the first reply, and once a valid reply appears, it will keep propagating:
Theorem 1 If some honest sensor holding K satisfies the predicate, then the keyed predicate test always succeeds. If no honest sensor holding K satisfies the predicate and no malicious sensor holds K , then the keyed predicate test can never succeed.
Proof sketch The second claim is trivial since MAC K (N ) will never be generated. For the first claim, it is obvious that some honest sensor A will generate the reply MAC K (N ). The question is whether this reply will be propagated to the base station, given that each sensor only forwards at most one message. But if a sensor drops the reply from A because it previously forwarded some other reply, that other reply must be MAC K (N ) as well. More formally, there exists a path (which is implicit and unknown by the protocol) from A to the base station that consists of only honest sensors Minimum # black keys needed to invoke the occupancy bound 30 (
The example values are also what we use later in simulation (see Sect. 3), and each sensor on that path must have forwarded a reply MAC K (N ). Thus the base station is guaranteed to receive MAC K (N ).
Sample a set efficiently
Set sampling enables the base station to test whether any sensor in a given set satisfies the predicate (but not how many sensors). It is straightforward to implement set sampling using keyed predicate test. For example, consider a set of three sensors {A, B, C}. At deployment time, we can load a symmetric key K corresponding to the set onto the three sensors.
To sample the set, the base station simply performs a keyed predicate test on K . The bit complexity incurred is always O (1) and is independent of the set size. Notice that such set sampling is possible only because we can preload K onto the three sensors. Set sampling has several important restrictions. First, the sets must be constructed before deployment. Second, since sensors may be deployed incrementally, when adding new sensors, we cannot change the set membership of old sensors. Finally, due to limited capacity of sensors and because each set requires loading a distinct symmetric key onto the sensor, a sensor can only belong to a small number of sample sets. Thus, only an extremely small fraction of all the 2 n subsets of the sensors can be used.
6 Tree sampling-assuming all sensors are honest Section 6 through 8 explain the tree sampling protocol, in a progressive fashion. Section 6 first describes tree sampling for predicate count while assuming all sensors are honest. Section 7 explains why the protocol can easily account for malicious sensors, and proves formal guarantees. Section 8 generalizes to sum and average. We leave to the appendix some additional and more complex algorithmic tricks to further reduce tree sampling's bit complexity to
Overview for computing predicate count
We say that a sensor is black if it satisfies the predicate in the predicate count query. Let b be the number of black sensors ( Table 1 ). The naive way of sampling would be to draw certain number of uniformly random samples from the n sensors, calculate the fraction of black sensors observed, and finally multiply that fraction with n to obtain an estimation for b. To obtain an (ε, δ)-approximation for b in the above approach, we will need to sample
Intuitively, when b is small, we need many samples in order to encounter any black sensor. Before encountering a reasonable number of black sensors, one cannot properly estimate b.
Set sampling offers the potential of overcoming such lower bound. Namely, we can construct the sets such that regardless of how small b is, some sets will contain black sensors. For example, if we define a set to include all sensors, then as long as b > 0, the keyed predicate test on that set will succeed. This by itself of course, does not allow us to properly estimate b. In tree sampling, the basic idea is to leverage different (related) sets of different sizes. The key research question is how to define these sets and how to sample them (not all sets will be sampled), with the goal of minimizing the number of sets sampled. 
Using the sampling tree to construct random sets
We use a sampling tree to construct the sets for sampling. This tree is an internal data structure stored by the base station, where every tree node is a distinct symmetric key. The sampling tree has no relation to the topology of the sensor network. In particular, nodes/edges in the tree are not sensors or communication links. Specifically, the sampling tree is a complete binary tree with 4N leaves and log(4N ) levels. We will explain the magic number "4" later. N is a reasonable upper bound on the intended sensor network deployment size. If N is overly large (e.g., exponential of n), tree sampling will unnecessarily incur O
δ log n bit complexity. The practical difference is likely to be small though since it is logarithmic. To simplify notation, we assume N = n in the following.
The root of the sampling tree is at level 0 while the leaves are at level h = log(4n) (Fig. 1) . Each tree node is a distinct symmetric key. At deployment time, the base station generates random keys as tree nodes. For each sensor deployed (which can be deployed incrementally), the base station picks a uniformly random leaf, and then loads onto the sensor all log(4n) keys on the tree path from the root to that leaf. For example, in Fig. 1 , the five keys K 1 through K 5 are loaded onto sensor A. We say that the sensor is now associated with that leaf. After deploying n sensors, it is possible for some leaves never to be chosen or to be chosen multiple times. The sampling tree is only stored by the base station.
In addition to the symmetric keys loaded onto each sensor so far, the base station further loads one additional and unique symmetric key onto each sensor. This symmetric key allows the base station to sample individual sensors (or equivalently, sets containing exactly one sensor) when necessary.
Protocol overview
From now on, when we say "sample a key K ", we mean invoking the keyed predicate test on key K . The tree sampling protocol will sample some carefully (and adaptively) chosen keys on the sampling tree. A key K at level i corresponds to a random set containing roughly A key K in the sampling tree is black if there is at least one black sensor holding K . Obviously, if a leaf key is black, then all keys on the path from that leaf to the root must be black as well. We use n i and b i to denote the number of keys and black keys at level i, respectively. We define r i = b i /n i (Fig. 1) .
If we knew the color of all tree nodes (i.e., keys), then one could estimate b relatively easily. However, the color of the keys are unknown beforehand, since it depends on which sensors satisfy the predicate in the current query. We can sample individual keys to reveal their colors, and the goal of tree sampling is to estimate b by revealing the colors of only a small fraction of the keys. To do so, the protocol will leverage a number of interesting properties of the sampling tree. Figure 2 presents the high-level pseudo-code of the protocol, where Step 2 in the protocol is detailed in Fig. 3 . The protocol starts by sampling the root key, and returns the precise count of 0 if the root key is not black. Otherwise it uses the binary search protocol from Fig. 3 to find a certain level α on the tree where r α is bounded away from both 0 and 1. Later at Step 5, ifr α · n α is larger than some number c 3 , the protocol can translater α to the final estimation for b.
(Here the hat "ˆ" means estimated value, same below). If not, the protocol continues onto lower levels until certain conditions are met, and then return an estimation for b. The next section explains the protocol in much greater detail, while ignoring Steps 4 and 8. Section 7 will explain those two steps, which serve to deal with malicious sensors.
6.2 The "appropriate" level α and finding it via binary search As explained earlier, the challenge in naive sampling arises when b/n is small. From the structure of the sampling tree, one can trivially prove that b i /n i = r i monotonically increases as we move up the tree ( Fig. 1 ≤ 1 (Fig. 1) . In other words, as we move down the tree, r i monotonically decreases and the maximum decrease is half. At the bottom of the tree, we must have
Together with r 0 = 1, this guarantees the existence of an "appropriate" level:
Proof Prove by contradiction. Since r h < 1 4 and r 0 = 1, we must be able to find two adjacent levels j and j + 1, where r j > 1 2 and r j+1 < 1 4 . But this would imply r j+1 /r j < 0.5, which is impossible.
The interval of
To find such an "appropriate" level, since r i is monotonic with i, we use a binary search on the log(4n) levels (Fig. 3) . [8] shows that taking c 1 samples gives the following error guarantee: (1)
We say that anr i is good if it satisfies Eq. 1. The first inequality above says that if r i is not too small, thenr i is within (1 ± 1 4 ) factor of r i . The second inequality shows that if r i is small, then at leastr i is not likely to be too large. We pick the factor (Fig. 4) . Notice that ifr α ∈ 3 16 , 5 8 and ifr α is good, then r α may not actually be in The total number of samples taken by the binary search is O(log log n · log log log n δ ) = o(log n log 1 δ ). The protocol then (at Step 3) further takes c 2 = ( 1 ε 2 log 1 δ ) uniformly random samples (with replacement) at level α to obtain an (ε, δ)-approximation ofr α for r α . This is possible because b α /n α is already known to be larger than 3 20 (assuming the binary search was successful).
Using occupancy bound to estimate b
The binary search finds a level α where r α is bounded away from 1. Tree sampling will eventually estimate b based on eitherr α or some r i where i > α. Notice that since i > α and r i ≤ r α , r i will be guaranteed to be bounded away from 1 as well.
To obtain some intuition for the final estimation, consider any given level i and the n i subtrees rooted at the n i keys at that level. The probability that a given sensor is associated with any of the leaves of a given subtree is exactly
We can thus draw a connection to the classic balls-into-bins problems [24] where each black sensor is a ball and goes into a uniformly random bin out of n i bins. A key at level i is black iff the bin is not empty. Our task is to estimate the number of balls (b) given the number of occupied bins (b i ).
Given b balls and n i bins, we have the expected number of 
The crux, of course, is to understand how accurate the estimator is. We are able to prove that the aboveb is an (ε, δ)-approximation of b if (i) r i is bounded away from 1 by some constant, and (ii)
δ ) for some universal constant c 3 . The proving technique is largely standard except that it uses a Chernoff-type occupancy tail bound from [12] . The complete proof is available as Lemma 7 in the appendix. It is worth noting that c 3 contains the term log 1 δ (with δ = δ/ log max(4ε 2 n, 2)) instead of log 1 δ . This is because our proof needs to invoke a union bound across all O(log(4ε 2 n)) levels below level α.
"Tracking down" the tree
After the binary search returns a level α, the protocol first tries to invoke an occupancy bound on level α (Step 5) to estimate b fromr α . 7 If this is not possible becauser α · n α < c 3 , the protocol exhaustively samples all n α keys at level α (Step 6). Quite interestingly, we can efficiently do so exactly becauser α · n α < c 3 , which implies that n α <c 3 /r α < Only black keys can have black children keys. Thus after knowing the color of all keys at level α, we can "track down" the tree efficiently starting from level α (Step 7). To "track down" to level α+1 and reveal the color of all the keys on that level, the protocol simply samples all the children of the level-α black keys, incurring exactly 2b
We now know the color of all keys at level α + 1. If r α+1 · n α+1 ≥ c 3 , we can outputb from Eq. 2 with i = α + 1. Otherwise the protocol continues on and tracks down to level α + 2 by taking 2b α+1 = r α+1 · n α+1 < 2c 3 = O( 
Reaching the bottom
We may reach the bottom of the tree without being able to invoke the occupancy bound. In such a case, we must have b h < c 3 = ( Classic balls-into-bins problem [24] tells us that if we throw n balls into 4n bins uniformly randomly, with probability at least 1− 1 n , the most loaded bin contains O(log n) balls. Thus the expected number of balls in the most loaded bin will be at most
This mean that the b h leaves will have on expectation O(b h log n) sensors associated with them. Sampling all these sensors will take O( 1 ε 2 log 1 δ log n) samples on expectation.
Tree sampling-accounting for malicious sensors
This section models the disruptive behavior of malicious sensors, and then proves the end guarantees of tree sampling despite the malicious sensors. In particular, we will explain why Steps 4 and 8 in Fig. 2 are needed. Because the sensors are associated with the leaves of the sampling tree independently and uniformly randomly, and further because the sampling tree is stored only at the (trusted) base station, we will assume that each malicious sensor is associated with a uniformly random leaf independently.
Modeling the adversary
We say that a sensor is black if it is honest and it satisfies the predicate. It is white if it is honest but does not satisfy the predicate. A sensor is grey if it is malicious. It is worth noting that because a sensor holds all the keys on the path from the root of the sampling tree to that sensor, compromising a sensor enables the adversary to acquire all those keys on that path. Some of those keys (especially those keys near the root) may be held by other sensors as well. One may wonder whether this enables the malicious sensor to act on behalf of other sensors, and potentially for example, significantly increase the final count generated by the algorithm. Fortunately, this is not possible, and the fundamental reason is that to effectively act on behalf of another sensor, the adversary needs to possess all keys on that sensor. In fact, without such property, tree sampling would have failed already even without malicious sensors: Without such property, if a black (honest) sensor shared certain keys with 10 other white (honest) sensors, then that single black sensor might very well contribute 11 to the final count instead of 1.
For better understanding of the above reasoning, let us consider a concrete example where the adversary compromises a single sensor, and assume that all the honest sensors are white. Compromising that sensor enables the adversary to acquire one (e.g., K 1 ) out of the two symmetric keys (denoted as K 1 and K 2 ) on level 1 of the sampling tree. K 1 is actually possessed by roughly half of all the white sensors. Knowing K 1 , however, does not enable the adversary to trick tree sampling to return a count of roughly n/2. In fact, in this particular case, the maximum count that the adversary can force tree sampling to return is 1 (assuming ε ≤ 0.5 and δ ≤ 0.5).
The reason is that the adversary does not possess enough symmetric keys at lower levels of the sampling tree. In order to acquire those keys, the adversary needs to compromise more sensors.
We use b, w, and g to denote the number of black, white, and grey sensors, respectively. As discussed in Sect. 3, we do not aim at preventing the malicious sensors from lying about their own readings. Thus any result within [b, b + g] is considered as correct for the predicate count query. A key in the sampling tree is black if at least one black sensor holds it. A key is white if only white sensors hold it. Finally, a key is grey if it is neither black nor white. We let b i , w i , and g i be the number of black, white, and grey keys at level i, respectively. The total number of keys at level i is still n i . Similar as before, we consider an r i value as correct for level
. Namely, any value within the previous range corresponds to some possible "instantiation" of the readings from the malicious sensors. One can trivially prove the following simple sandwiching property:
Lemma 3 If r i and r i (r i < r i ) are both correct for level i, then any r i ∈ [r i , r i ] is correct for level i as well.
Now let us consider how the adversary can attack tree sampling. A nice feature of tree sampling is that the protocol is executed locally by the trusted base station, except when the protocol invokes keyed predicate tests to sample keys. Keyed predicate tests always return a binary result. This extremely simple interface allows us to reason about security cleanly.
When we sample a key, we say that the key tests black if the keyed predicate test succeeds. Otherwise it tests white. Applying Theorem 1 immediately tells us that black keys always test black and white keys always test white. Thus the only possible attack on tree sampling is for the adversary to manipulate the (binary) sample results of grey keys. We assume that tree sampling never samples the same key more than once. This can be trivially achieved by the base station remembering the color of the keys already sampled. Now all the adversary can do is to control which grey keys should test black and which should test white.
On a given level i, regardless of the adversary's choices, tree sampling is guaranteed to "observe" some correct r i when operating on that level. Namely, the r i "observed" must fall between . Similarly, Eq. 2 (i.e., the occupancy bound) can still produce an (ε, δ)-approximation, since it is only concerned with the probabilistic property of a single level. On the other hand, the situation can become trickier when tree sampling relies on properties across multiple tree levels. As an example, the grey sensors can make the observed r i and r i+1 to differ by more than a factor of 2, if they let all the level-i grey keys test black and all the level-(i + 1) grey keys test white. The next section will prove tree sampling's guarantees despite all such attacks.
Provable property of the binary search
We will first show that despite the existence of grey keys, the binary search from Fig. 3 still provides a . To obtain some intuition on why the theorem holds, we will refer to the steps in Fig. 3 . We say that anr i obtained at Step 2.4 in Fig. 3 Proof for Theorem 3 First of all, the binary search is guaranteed to return after examining log log(4n) levels and taking log log(4n) estimates. Since each estimate is good with probability at least 1 − δ log log(4n) (by Lemma 2), a simple union bound tells us that the probability that all estimates are good is at least 1 − δ.
Conditioned upon all estimates being good, if an α is returned at Step 2.7, we know thatr α ∈ [ 
Main theorems on tree sampling
We can now prove the main theorem on tree sampling regarding its bit complexity and approximation error. We first provide some intuition while referring to Fig. 2 . Tree sampling may return an estimation for b at Step 1, 5, 9, or 10. The result returned at Step 1 and 10 is always correct regardless of the behavior of the grey sensors. In particular for Step 10, when tracking down the tree, the algorithm will always track down black keys since the parent of a black key must be black as well.
Step 5 and 9 invoke the occupancy bound. As explained earlier, the approximation error guarantee of the occupancy bound relies on the probabilistic property of a single level, and thus will still hold despite the grey keys.
The only tricky part is that the occupancy bound invoked by Step 5 implicitly requires thatr α be bounded away from 1. Without grey keys and after a successful binary search, this requirement will always be met because a successful binary search guarantees r α ≤ 5 6 . With grey keys, the binary search still guarantees that some correct r α is no larger than 5 6 . But the grey keys on level α may interfere by testing black at
Step 3 8 . This may cause ther α obtained at Step 3 to be close to 1.
The key observation here is that this close-to-oner α is entirely artificial, and is caused by the grey sensors testing black. Given that a successful binary search already guarantees the existence of some correct r α ≤ A similar issue can arise when Step 9 invokes the occupancy bound, if the grey sensors cause the observed r i to be close to 1. Similar as before, we already know that there is some correct r α ≤ Next we prove the approximation error inb. As explained earlier, we do not intend to prevent malicious sensors from reporting arbitrary values themselves, so any value x ∈ [b, b + g] is considered correct. Tree sampling may output ab in Step 1, 5, 9, and 10. Consider these four cases one by one. In Step 1, if the root tests white, then we are guaranteed to have no black sensors and thusb = 0 ∈ [0, 0 + g]. In
Step 10, we trivially haveb ≤ n − w = b + g, since white sensors can never test black. Furthermore, when tracking down the tree, we will never miss any black sensor since the parent (and ancestors) of a black sensor must be black.
Step 5 and 9, define event B to be the event that the binary search is successful and ther α obtained in Step 3 is good. Obviously, the probability of B happening is at least 1 − 2δ. Conditioned upon B, Lemma 4 below will show that (i) ther α used in Step 5 is within (1 ± ε) factor of some correct r α (even ifr α has been modified in Step 4), and (ii) the r i used in Step 9 is correct (even if r i has been modified in Step 8) . Finally, conditioned upon B, the occupancy bound tells us that theb returned in Step 5 or 9 is within (1 ± ε) factor of some x ∈ [b, b + g] with probability at least 1 − δ.
So far, the probability ofb not falling within (1 ± ε) factor of x is at most 4δ (one δ introduced by each of Step 2, 3, 5, and 9). Taking δ = δ 0 /4 and ε = ε 0 completes the proof. Proof We will prove that the two claims hold conditioned upon the binary search being successful andr α being within (1 ± ε) factor of some correct r α . Obviously, these pre-conditions hold with probability at least 1 − 2δ.
Lemma 4 To avoid notation collision, in the following
Ifr α ∈ [ We next move on to the time complexity of our algorithm. For protocols designed for synchronous systems, the time complexity is usually measured in terms of rounds. Let the flooding time T be the number of rounds needed to perform a single flooding in the sensor network (i.e., propagate a message from some given source to all other sensors). Obviously, T depends not only on n but also on the topology of the sensor network. We will measure the time complexity of our algorithm in terms of T . Compared to directly analyzing the total number of rounds, doing so helps to make our results general-one can trivially plug in different T values for different deployment topologies to obtain the total number of rounds as the final time complexity.
One can easily prove the following result on tree sampling's time complexity:
Theorem 5 Regardless of the behavior of the adversary, tree sampling in Fig. 2 terminates within O(T log n) rounds.
Proof Steps 1 and 3 take O(T ) rounds. The binary search at
Step 2 takes O(T log log n) rounds, since the binary search examines O(log log n) levels and all samples at a given level can be taken in parallel. Steps 4 through 6 take O(T ) rounds. Finally, Steps 7 through 10 may need to track down all the O(log n) levels on the tree, and thus take O(T log n) rounds.
It is worth noting that for secure aggregation queries in sensor networks, bit complexity is often considered to be more important than time complexity. This is especially because the bandwidth of the sensors is often limited. Thus time complexity (in terms of rounds and thus ignoring message sizes) can be dominated by the effects from bit complexity, and can fail to capture the actual execution time of the protocol. Because of this, none of the previous works [6, 15, 29] provides results on time complexity. Nevertheless, there is a trivial (T ) lower bound on the time complexity, which suggests that tree sampling's time complexity is at most log n factor away from the optimal.
Generalizing to sum/average
The tree sampling protocol for predicate count can be easily generalized to sum and average. Without loss of generality, we will assume that the reading on each sensor is an integer within [1, m] . The simplest way to compute the sum is to do a predicate count for each of the log 2 m bits in the binary form of readings. A much better approach, however, is for each sensor to "emulate" v virtual sensors. Predicate count can then be invoked on the v · n virtual sensors. At each invocation, a (physical) sensor can report a value between [0, v]. If we represent the sensor readings in base-(v + 1) format, we will only need to invoke predicate count log v+1 m times.
In each keyed predicate test, the bit complexity of a physical sensor is independent of the number of virtual sensors it emulates, since the physical sensor only needs to locally broadcast/forward the reply MAC K (N ) at most once. Thus the only cost of emulating v virtual sensors is to store O(log(vn)) keys for each of them. In most cases, we can afford to have v = √ m, and thus only need to invoke predicate count log v+1 m = O(1) times. The resulting bit complexity is then O( 1 ε 2 log 1 δ log(nm)), which is the same as O(
Finally, average is simply sum divided by count. The generalization of the formal arguments on approximation error to sum and average is straightforward.
Implementation issues
Despite the subtlety in some of its algorithmic concepts, tree sampling is rather straightforward to implement. Our simulator later implements the protocol from Fig. 2 in less than 200 lines of Java code. A salient feature of tree sampling is that the resource-constrained sensors only needs to implement the simple keyed predicate test from Sect. 5. The main protocol (i.e., Fig. 2) is only on the base station. Also, only the base station needs to store the sampling tree and each sensor only stores O(log n) keys.
Several important optimizations below should be used in a real implementation. Each sample in the protocol involves a keyed predicate test. The predicate and the nonce N in the test are the same for all samples, and thus only need to be disseminated once. The base station does not need to indicate the name of the key either, since a sensor only has a limited number of keys and it can simply try all of them. Thus each sample will only involve the base station broadcasting H(MAC K (N )), and then waiting for the potential reply of MAC K (N ). This means that every sample will require each sensor to send and receive two 8-byte payloads. Tree sampling only has O(log n) stages, where all samples within a stage can be taken in parallel and can thus be combined into smaller number of messages.
Simulation results
Our simulation aims to better understand the hidden constants in the asymptotic bit complexity of tree sampling, under some example parameter values. We first consider scenarios without malicious sensors.
For all experiments, we use n = 10,000. This n value is intentionally chosen to be large so that it can capture most sensor networks today. Smaller n only makes our results better. We aim to achieve an ε of 0.2 and a δ of 0.05. The average ε will be lower and will be around 0.08. Our choice of ε is consistent with prior work [17, 25] . We incorporate the following natural optimization: If the protocol intends to take s samples on a level (on the sampling tree) with less than s keys, it simply samples all keys on that level. We use c 1 = 40, c 2 = 200, and c 3 = 30 (as in Table 1 ) in our simulation. We have derived the asymptotic values of these three parameters earlier. One can directly plug in the constants derived in our proofs and the values of ε, δ, and n to obtain these parameters. Doing so is guaranteed to produce an (ε, δ)-approximation for b. On the other hand, since the proofs can be pessimistic, one can often use slightly better constants in practice. Tree sampling's estimation error is only affected by the probabilistic properties of the sampling tree, and is independent of the actual sensor network deployment. Thus to use the most appropriate constants in practice, one 6 Average number of samples taken by tree sampling. In addition to the "total" number of samples, we also plot the number of samples taken during "binary search", for "sampling level α", and also for "tracking down the tree". The number of samples taken in all other steps is negligible can always use simulation to determine such constants. Such simulation only needs to be done once and before the sensor network is deployed. This is how we obtain the above c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 for our experiments.
For a given b, we perform 200 simulation trials, and calculate the relative approximation error (i.e., |b − b|/b) in every trial. Figure 5 plots the average, 95-percentile, and 98-percentile approximation error achieved under different b values. The average error is around 0.08, while the 95-percentile is about 0.2. This means that the quality of the final estimate is roughly an (ε, δ)-approximation with ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.05. Figure 6 further quantifies the average number of samples taken by the algorithm. The total number of samples is roughly between 250 and 300, for all b values. These samples are taken in around 5-15 sequential stages. The number of samples taken during the binary search stage has large variation across different b values, and is not monotonic with b. This is easy to understand-under different b values, the level α will be at different locations on the sampling tree, and thus the binary search may examine different numbers of levels before finding level α.
As a quick comparison, our simulation also shows that naive sampling with 300 samples can provide a similar approximation error guarantee (i.e., ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.05) only when b is above 2,000 (i.e., n/b < 5). For b < 2,000, the lower bound of n b 1 ε 2 log 1 δ starts to become prominent. We explained earlier that while we do not aim at better performance, tree sampling's asymptotic bit complexity is similar to some previous aggregation-based approaches [17, 29] . These two approaches [17, 29] are rather similar and both use Flajolet-Martin sketches with signatures on the bits. They thus are likely to have similar bit complexity. We will compare against proof sketches [17] since their paper provides detailed performance results. Proof sketches can achieve roughly (ε = 0.1, δ = 0.05) using 256 FlajoletMartin sketches. Each sketch contains up to log 2 n signatures. If each signature is a MAC, then sending a signature back (8 bytes) will incur half of the bit complexity as taking a sample (8 × 2 bytes) in our protocol. Using public key signatures will simply make the signature size larger and make our results better. Under n = 10,000, proof sketches will incur a bit complexity of roughly 256 × log 2 10 5 ≈ 3, 328 signatures. One would expect that under (ε = 0.2, δ = 0.05), the number of signatures will be reduced by a factor of (0.2/0.1) 2 = 4. This yields 832 signatures, which is comparable to taking 416 samples. Remember that tree sampling achieves (ε = 0.2, δ = 0.05) with below 300 samples. This means that tree sampling's bit complexity is at least comparable to proof sketches.
Finally, we present simulation results under one example attack strategy from the adversary. We do not intend to be exhaustive here-experimental methods by definition cannot cover all strategies. Thus ultimately, the only way to reason about the impact of malicious sensors is via rigorous formal proofs, as in Sect. 7. Our experiments here purely serve as an example.
In this experiment, we consider n = 10,000 sensors. The adversary compromises g = 0 to 5,000 sensors out of them. Among the n − g honest sensors, we set the number of black sensors b = 5,000, while the remaining n − g −b sensors are white. Because some sensors are now compromised, some of the keys on the sampling tree are grey. As discusses in Sect. 7, the only way to influence the result of tree sampling is for the adversary to manipulate the binary sample results of grey keys. If all grey keys test white (or if all grey keys test black), then the attack will be exactly the same as if all the malicious sensors behave benignly and report a value of 0 (or 1). Thus to make the experiments non-trivial, we need to consider more intricate attack strategies. In our example attack strategy, the adversary makes all grey keys at odd levels of the sampling tree test black, and all grey keys at even levels test white. 9 This strategy is interesting because it maximizes the differ- number of malicious sensors result --2.5 percentile result --97.5 percentile Fig. 7 The estimation answer generated by tree sampling under an example attack strategy. The "result-2.5 percentile" value means that 2.5% of the 200 trials generate an answer that is below that value. The "result-97.5 percentile" value is similarly defined ence between the fractions of keys tested black at adjacent levels. In particular, the difference may now exceed a multiplicative factor of 2, which would never occur if the sensors were all honest. As discussed in Sect. 7, Steps 4 and 8 in Fig. 2 exactly serve to address such scenarios. Figure 7 plots the estimation answer generated by tree sampling for the predicate count query under this example attack strategy. Notice that as explained in Sect. 7, any value between b and b + g is considered as a correct and estimation-error-free answer for the query. Figure 7 shows that out of the 200 trials, except the top 2.5% (in terms of the value of the answer generated) of the trials and the bottom 2.5% of the trials, the remaining 95% of the trials all return answers roughly within 1 ± 0.2 multiplicative factor of some correct answers. This again, translates to roughly ε = 0.2 and δ = 0.05. The total number of samples taken by tree sampling in these experiments is still roughly 300.
Conclusion
This paper proposes a novel tree sampling algorithm with provable guarantees to always correctly answer aggregation queries in sensor networks despite adversarial interference. As a sharp contrast to conventional approaches, tree sampling directly uses sampling to answer these queries. To do so, the algorithm leverages a set sampling protocol which can efficiently sample a set of sensors together and determine whether any sensor in the set satisfies the predicate (but not how many). We have formally proved the correctness and preformance of our algorithm, and have also presented simulation results as numerical examples.
Appendix A: Proof for the occupancy bound used in section 6.3 Lemma 5 Chernoff-type occupancy tail bound [12] .
Consider an experiment where we throw b balls into n i bins. Let random variable Z denote the number of empty bins and b i
Then we have:
Comments on Lemma 5
There are other forms of occupancy tail bounds [21] . The bound in Lemma 5 is not the strongest one. However, its form is convenient for our purpose.
Introducing Lemma 6 To be as strong as possible, Lemma 6 below will assume that the binary search returns a level α where r α ≤ a < 1. In other words, we will show that r α being bounded away from 1 is sufficient. Theorem 3 proves that r α ∈ [ ], which is obviously more than sufficient to satisfy the condition in the lemma.
Lemma 6
For any given constant 0 < a < 1, we can find a universal constant c 3 > 1 with the following property. Define: 
We have the following relation:
Thus it suffices to prove:
Notice that for any given i, n i is not a random variable. If for the given i we have n i < c 3 , then the above event has 0 probability. Thus we only need to prove that for any given i where
Obviously, the probability of b i ≤ an i will only decrease as b increase. Thus it suffice to show that for
We will show that p 1 ≤ δ /2 and p 2 ≤ δ /2, respectively. Consider p 1 first:
For any c 3 ≥ x 2 = 24, we have:
Also, we have:
The above three equations imply: 
We move on to p 2 :
Let:
We have: 
Finally, letting
will then complete the proof.
Lemma 7
For any given constant 0 < a < 1, we can find a universal constant c 3 ≥ 1 with the following property. Define: 
Proof We applying Lemma 6 and set c 3 the same as the c 3 from Lemma 6. There are total log(4n) levels on the sampling tree, out of which at most log(4ε 2 n) levels have at least c 3 nodes. For the remaining levels, it is impossible for the event b i ≥ c 3 to occur, and thus we do not need to worry about them. Applying a union bound across the log(4ε 2 n) levels then immediately proves the lemma.
Comments on Lemma 7
Let E denote the event that our tree sampling algorithm returns an estimation via the occupancy bound and the estimation has larger than ε multiplicative error. Then trivially, we have Pr[E ] ≤ Pr [E] where E is defined as in Lemma 7. Namely, if E does not occur, then it is impossible for E to occur. As a result, Lemma 7 upper bounds Pr[E ] as well.
Also notice that it is necessary for us to reason about all levels in Lemma 7, instead of just the level from which the tree sampling algorithm returns a final result. This is because the algorithm might return from the level that provides the largest approximation error. We are not able to precisely reason about such probability, and as a result, we apply a pessimistic union bound across all levels in Lemma 7.
Appendix B: Further reducing the number of samples taken
The tree sampling protocol described in this paper so far incurs O , 2) ). To achieve this reduced number of samples, we will reduce/bound the number of samples taken during the following steps in tree sampling: -Currently the binary search at Step 2 ( Fig. 2) takes O log log n · log log log n δ samples. Section B.1 will prove that (log log n) · (log log log n) = O 1 ε · log max (ε 2 n, 2) , which in turn implies O log log n · log log log n δ
Step 10 ( Fig. 2) 
Proof We will prove that (log log n) · (log log log n) ≤ 2/ε · log max(ε 2 n, 2). If ε 2 ≤ 2/n, we need to prove:
The above equation holds because 2/ε ≥ √ 2n and because √ 2n ≥ (log log n) · (log log log n) holds for all n. Now consider ε 2 > 2/n, and we need to prove:
Let x = ε and define f (x) = (log log n) · (log log log n) − (2/x) · log(x 2 n). One can easily verify that f (x) ≤ 0 for √ 2/n ≤ x ≤ √ 4/n and f (x) ≥ 0 for √ 4/n ≤ x ≤ 1. This means that the maximum of f (x) is reached either when x = √ 2/n or when x = 1. We have f ( √ 2/n) = (log log n) · (log log log n) − √ 2n < 0 for all n, and also f (1) = (log log n) · (log log log n) − 2 log n < 0 for all n. Thus f (x) is negative for all x and n.
B.2 Reducing samples taken when sampling all black leaves in step 10
Reducing the number of samples taken in Step 10 is simple. Instead of using a sampling tree with 4n leaves, we can use a sampling tree with 4n 1.5 leaves. This will make the expected number of sensors associated with any leave to be O (1) . On the other hand, The n 1.5 term will only appear in logarithmic form in other steps of the protocol, which is still O(log n). This technique thus reduces the number of samples taken in Step 10 to O( It may appear that a sampling tree with 4n 1.5 leaves can be quite large, and even the resourceful base station may not be able to easily store it. Interestingly, even if the sampling tree has 4n 1.5 leaves, every sensor will still be loaded with only log(4n 1.5 ) keys. With total n sensors, the total number of keys that are actually loaded onto the sensors is at most n log(4n 1.5 ) = O(n log n). This means that a lot of the keys in the sampling tree will not actually be used. The base station can thus create keys only as needed in a lazy fashion, and the total number of keys that the base station needs to store is O(n log n) instead of O(n 1.5 ). To be concrete, even with n = 10,000, the number of keys needed to be stored by the base station is only 220,000, which is trivial compared to even a commodity PC's disk space.
B.3 Reducing samples taken when tracking down the tree in step 7
To reduce the number of samples taken in Step 7, we will reduce the number of samples taken at each level. The number of samples taken at each level is determined by the occupancy bound, which can only be invoked when b i = ( 
B.3.1 Small occupancy bound
We continue our analogy to the balls-into-bins problem from Sect. 6. 
Pr[F] ≤ δ
Proof We applying Lemma 9 and set c 4 the same as the c 4 from Lemma 9. There are total log(4n) levels on the sampling tree, out of which at most log(4ε 2 n) levels have at least 2c 4 /ε nodes. For the remaining levels, it is impossible for the events b i ≥ c 4 and b i /n i ≤ ε/2 to both occur. Thus we do not need to worry about them. Applying a union bound across the log(4ε 2 n) levels then immediately proves the lemma.
Comments on Lemma 10 Similar as for Lemma 7, here Lemma 10 bounds the probability that the tree sampling algorithm returns an estimate with large error when invoking the small occupancy bound.
B.3.2 Using both occupancy bound and small occupancy bound
It remains non-trivial to prove exactly how much improvement the small occupancy bound can help us to achieve. We first provide some intuitions. When we track down the tree starting from level α, intuitively r i should decrease quickly. The reason is that n i always doubles when i increments. But b i is much less likely to double, given that some fraction of the bins at level α is already empty. Let β to be the highest level that satisfies r β ≤ Reasoning about the number of samples needed to go from level α to level β is more complex, and Lemma 11 below proves that conditioned upon the binary search being successful, the number is O( A second complication is that both α and β are random variables, which can make the arguments a little convoluted.
To circumvent these problems, suppose that a successful binary search always returns a level α such that 0 < a ≤ r α ≤ a < 1. Here a and a are constants and Theorem 3 guarantees the existence of a and a. we define level γ to be the highest level in the tree with at least c 3 /a nodes, where c 3 is defined as in Lemma 7 . Notice that γ is not a random variable. Lemma 12 will prove that there exists some universal constant c such that:
Pr b γ /n γ ≤ a and β − γ > c log 1 ε < δ
Conditioned upon the binary search being successful, we consider two cases. If α ≥ γ , then we must have b α ≥ a · n α ≥ a · n γ ≥ c 3 . This means that b α is already large enough to invoke the occupancy bound. The algorithm will then return ab at level α and will never need to track down the tree.
If 
Lemma 12
Consider any given constant 0 < a < a < 1. Define γ as in Lemma 11 . We can always find universal constants c (which is uniquely determined by a and a) such that Pr b γ /n γ ≤ a and β − γ > c log 1 ε < δ
Notice that here b γ and β are random variables, while γ, n γ , and a are not.
